This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in an economy with general interdependencies and complex property rights. The right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners a form of monopoly power that influences granular economic interactions. Equilibrium networks reflect the distribution of these ownership claims. Inefficient production networks may endure in equilibrium as firms multisource to mitigate hold-up risk. Short supply chains also reduce this risk, but may preclude the production of complex goods. A generalized Top Trading Cycles algorithm, applicable to a production economy, identifies equilibrium outcomes in the model. Such outcomes can be decentralized via a price system.
Introduction
general. Goods in our model can be rival or non-rival. They include primary goods, intermediate inputs, finished products, human-capital/labor inputs, laws or policies, and even ideas.
Firms transform sets of inputs into sets of outputs. A firm's output can be an input for another firm. Agents own the economy's goods. Unlike traditional models of exchange or production, we allow for general ownership structures to emphasize the role of varied and complex property rights. A good may be owned privately, owned jointly by a coalition, or be part of the social endowment. An outcome in our model consists of a consumption allocation, which describes consumers' choices, and a production network, which defines firms' production decisions.
To analyze our economy, we examine its exclusion core. The exclusion core is a cooperative solution introduced by Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to study discrete exchange economies with complex property rights, including cases with joint or contested ownership.
Traditional solutions, such as the core, fail to fully capture the implications of agents exercising their exclusion rights. 4 Roughly, at an exclusion core allocation no coalition has the incentive and the ability to veto or block others' consumption by invoking its right to exclude. The latter is defined by the ownership of the economy's goods. We provide a self-contained introduction to the exclusion core solution in Section 3, though we stress here that it is uniquely suited for our analysis. First, the exclusion core's motivation emphasizes the exclusion aspect of property. It rests on a reinterpretation of agents' endowments in an economy as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of tradable things. And second, the concept is sensitive to the endogenous network of economic activity. Recalling the example above, it accounts for Alice's indirect leverage (via Bob) on Carol.
Our paper has three contributions. First, we generalize the exclusion core solution to a production economy. 5 Our generalization exploits inter-firm linkages-an output of firm f is an input for firm f ′ -to transmit threats of exclusion and hold-up. Thus, a production network extends a coalition's power beyond the goods that it owns directly, a fact that constrains equilibrium production networks. We investigate two versions of the exclusion core that differ in the ease with which coalitions can rewire production plans. The ex post exclusion core characterizes short-run outcomes where the underlying production network is rigid. The ex ante exclusion core characterizes long-run outcomes where production plans are fully flexible. Together, these benchmarks bound all plausible intermediate cases.
Second, we identify sufficient conditions for an economy's ex ante and ex post exclusion cores to be nonempty. Roughly, there must be "sufficient integration" in the ownership structure of each good's supply chain. This condition is much weaker than complete vertical integration and suggests how property rights can be arranged to limit hold-up risk. Ex ante exclusion core production networks may involve firms employing seemingly redundant inputs. By multisourcing, firms hedge against hold-up risk. Our model characterizes the operation of an economy reliant solely on property relations, as opposed to more elaborate contracts.
Our third contribution connects to a literature distinct from that of property rights or economic organization. Our model generalizes Shapley and Scarf's (1974) "house exchange" economy, famous for its introduction of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm (attributed to David Gale) . Our existence results rely on the first generalization of the TTC algorithm to a production economy. The novelties necessitated by production have intuitive economic interpretations in terms of simplifying supply chains and identifying firm boundaries. The monotonicity of the assignment process induced by the TTC algorithm stands behind our generalization and links the exclusion core with price equilibria in our model.
Our model emphasizes production in a networked economy. We argue that the resulting transaction network is closely tied to the distribution property rights, particularly the right to exclude. Importantly, the same underlying principles operate in many domains. Networks play a central role in international trade. These often bend to the exclusion power of governments (e.g., embargoes). In politics, legislators "produce" laws by bundling together policy proposals. The challenge is to neutralize the veto (i.e., exclusion) power of blocking coalitions.
And, layers of "red tape," i.e., exclusion rights held by bureaucrats, allow for rent extraction. Adaptations of our model can tackle these applications, among many others.
Outline Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the exclusion core solution concept in the special case of an exchange economy. Section 4 generalizes the analysis to a production economy. Section 5 outlines the proof of our main theorem and introduces our generalization of the TTC algorithm. Section 6 discusses multisourcing and section 7 considers price equilibria. We conclude by relating our study to the literatures on property rights and production networks. For expositional ease, we simplify several features of our environment.
Appendices A and B explain how our model embeds a larger class of production processes and preferences than emphasized in our main exposition. Appendix C provides an example of our algorithm's operation. Appendix D contains all proofs.
Model
An economy = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉 consists of agents, firms, goods, a preference profile, and an endowment system. I := {i 1 , . . ., i n } and F := {f 1 , . . ., f m } are finite sets of agents and firms, respectively. X is a finite set of goods, which can be very general. It may contain consumption goods (e.g., an apple) and production inputs, such as raw materials (e.g., a ton of iron ore), labor inputs (e.g., an hour of welding), and intangibles (e.g., a computer chip design). Each good x has a capacity q x ∈ {1, ∞} defining the number of agents and firms that can simultaneously consume it or use it as an input. A rival good, like the apple, has capacity one. A non-rival good, like the chip design, has infinite capacity.
Goods are partitioned into a set of primary goods and sets of goods produced by each firm, i.e., X = X 0 ∪ ( f ∈F X f ) where X f ∩ X f ′ = ∅ for all f = f ′ . The set X 0 consists of primary goods that do not require production. The goods in set X f are available if and only if they are produced by firm f using the eponymous production function f : 2 X → {∅, X f }. Thus, a firm transforms sets of inputs into a set of (net) outputs. 6 For example, a computer manufacturer might transform labor and computer parts into finished computers and new technologies created by research and development. The former are consumer products; the latter are inputs for other firms. Each production function is monotone (Z ⊆ Z ′ =⇒ f (Z ) ⊆ f (Z ′ )) and satisfies the "no free lunch" property (f (∅) = ∅).
For simplicity, we assume that production has a 0/1 character. Either firm f produces nothing or all of X f is created. To scale production, posit there are multiple copies of firm f .
Each copy produces a version of X f that differs only in an inconsequential way, such as the goods' serial numbers. This framework can embed production processes with decreasing and increasing returns to scale (see Appendix A).
Each agent i has a strict preference ≻ i defined over X and an outside option x 0 / ∈ X representing "no consumption." For simplicity, we assume each agent has unit demand. If x ∈
In examples, we state an agent's preference by listing goods in his preferred order, i.e., ≻ i : x , x ′ , . . ..
Unlisted items are inferior to the outside option. Appendix B outlines how to incorporate consumption of multiple goods into our model.
Property rights are a focus of our analysis. Accordingly, we posit a general framework subsuming private and public ownership as special cases. The economy's endowment system ω: 2 I → 2 X identifies the goods owned by each coalition. It satisfies three basic properties.
(A1) Agency: ω(∅) = ∅.
(A2) Monotonicity:
(A3) Exhaustivity: ω(I ) = X .
Thus, ownership is restricted to agents or groups (A1), a coalition owns anything belonging to a sub-coalition (A2), and the grand coalition owns everything (A3). We further assume the endowment system satisfies (A4) Weak non-contestability: For each x ∈ X , the set C x := C ∈{C ′ |x ∈ω(C ′ )} C is not empty.
Assumption (A4) says that each good x has an essential set of principal owners C x . Any group asserting ownership of x must count C x among its members. The assumption relaxes Balbuzanov and Kotowski's ( , p. 1667 ) non-contestability condition.
Many situations satisfy (A1)-(A4). If x is privately owned by i , then x ∈ ω(i ) and C x = {i }.
If x is collectively owned by everyone, C x is the grand coalition and
, then its principals require others' cooperation to exercise de facto control over x . Another interesting case arises when goods produced by the same firm have different principals (i.e., x , y ∈ X f but C x = C y ). For example, seats at a concert might be controlled by the concert promoter but rights to the concert's recording might belong to a record label.
An outcome (µ, γ) consists of a consumption allocation and a production network. A consumption allocation µ: I → X ∪ {x 0 } identifies the good consumed by each agent. Denote the goods consumed by coalition C ⊆ I as µ(C ) := i ∈C µ(i ).
A production network γ: F → 2 X identifies the inputs used ("consumed") by each firm.
Denote the goods used by firms in set G ⊆ F as γ(G ) := f ∈G γ(f ) and, abusing notation, let f G (γ) := f ∈G f (γ(f )) be these firms' aggregate (gross) output at γ.
Condition (a) says that every good that is consumed or used in production is a primary good, a good produced at γ, or the outside option. Condition (b) says that the number of agents and firms assigned an item cannot exceed its capacity.
Let Γ be the set of feasible production networks.
To help fix ideas, Figure 1 illustrates two outcomes in an economy. There are two agents with endowments ω(i 1 ) = {x 1 , x 3 , x 4 } and ω(i 2 ) = {x 2 , x 5 }. In the figure, each good is "pointing" to its principal owner. Each good has unit capacity. Goods x 2 and x 4 are produced by firms f 1 γ) . All goods are available.
. Good x 2 is not available. Figure 1 : Example outcomes in a private-ownership economy.
and f 2 , respectively. The other goods are primary goods. The firms' production functions are
Goods x 1 and x 4 are complements in the production of x 2 . Goods x 3 and x 5 are substitutes in the production of x 4 . Figure 1 (a) represents the outcome
In the figure, each agent is "pointing" to his assigned consumption good. Each produced good is "pointing" to the input(s) used in its production (dashed lines). In this case, x 4 (produced by f 2 ) is an input for x 2 (produced by f 1 ). Figure 1 
Now, x 4 is consumed by i 1 and cannot be used to make x 2 . Thus, x 2 is unavailable.
Remark 1. Each outcome sketch in this paper follows Figure 1's conventions. A solid arrow links each agent with his assigned good, or each privately-owned good with its owner. A dashed arrow connects each produced good to the inputs used in its production.
Exchange Economies
We aim to characterize production networks and trading patterns in light of the economy's property rights distribution. Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) study a related question focusing only on an exchange economy. They argue that classic solution concepts, such as the core, fail to shed light on this problem in markets with complex property arrangements, as in our model. Accordingly, Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) introduce an alternative solution called the exclusion core. The exclusion core's foundation is a reinterpretation of endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights over the economy's goods. This section, based on Balbuzanov and , provides a self-contained exposition of this idea in an exchange economy. We pursue the production economy generalization in Section 4.
Consider the model introduced in Section 2, but without production. Only primary goods exist and an outcome reduces to a consumption allocation. A familiar intuition, dating to at least Edgeworth, is that an allocation that can be improved upon, or "blocked," by some coalition is unlikely to materialize or endure. Traditionally, a coalition can block an allocation in an exchange economy if it can reallocate the goods in its endowment in a way that its members prefer. However, for a reallocation to be possible, it is necessary to exclude non-coalition members from those goods, possibly harming them in the process. This more basic principle is at the heart of exclusion blocking.
Definition 1. Coalition C ⊆ I can directly exclusion block the allocation µ if there exists an
Two conditions must hold for a coalition to directly exclusion block an allocation µ. First, all coalition members must prefer an alternative allocation σ. And second, if an agent is harmed by the move from µ to σ, he must be excluded by this process from something in the coalition's endowment. Thus, a coalition has the interest and the ability, based on its exclusion rights, to veto the allocation µ. The direct exclusion core is the set of allocations that cannot be directly exclusion blocked by any nonempty coalition.
What indirect implications do exclusion rights entail? The case of Alice, Bob, and Carol from the introduction suggests that trade-related interdependencies can amplify an agent's de facto power. For example, consider a private-ownership economy with three agents and three goods. Their preferences are
Each agent is "pointing" to his assigned good and each good is "pointing" to its owner (i.e.,
x k ∈ ω(i k )). At µ, i 1 and i 3 receive their favorite items; i 2 gets x 3 , but prefers x 1 . The allocation µ cannot be directly exclusion blocked, but can i 2 somehow shift the outcome in his favor?
Agent i 2 has indirect exclusion rights to x 1 given i 1 's dependence on x 2 ∈ ω(i 2 ) at µ. Figure 2 : An allocation that can be destabilized through indirect exclusion.
Since x 1 / ∈ ω(i 2 ), i 2 lacks the direct exclusion rights to prevent i 3 from receiving x 1 . Those rights belong to i 1 . However, i 1 is assigned x 2 , which belongs to i 2 . Formally,
Given this dependency, agent i 2 may press i 1 to prevent i 3 's consumption of x 1 by threatening to exclude i 1 from x 2 . Agent i 1 would reasonably accept this demand as x 2 is his favorite item.
As illustrated in Figure 2 (b), this fragility destabilizes µ-the matching µ is unlikely to endure.
Though Figure 2 examines a relatively simple case, its underlying logic generalizes. Everything proceeds by induction. Coalition C has direct exclusion rights to all things in its endowment, ω(C ). At one step of influence, it has direct or indirect exclusion rights to all goods
And so on. The limit defines the coalition's extended endowment, which describes its de facto exclusion power accounting for the network of interdependencies induced by exchange.
Definition 2. The extended endowment of coalition C (in an exchange economy) at µ is
The next definition repeats Definition 1, except Ω(·|ω, µ) appears in part (b).
Definition 3. Coalition C ⊆ I can indirectly exclusion block the allocation µ if there exists an
The exclusion core is the set of allocations that cannot be indirectly exclusion blocked by any nonempty coalition. No coalition can improve upon an exclusion core allocation by invoking its direct or indirect exclusion rights.
Revisiting the example above, the allocation µ is not an exclusion core allocation. It can be indirectly exclusion blocked by i 2 . The unique exclusion core allocation is
which is illustrated in Figure 3 (a). Whereas i 3 would like to claim x 1 , the network of trades induced by σ protects i 1 and i 2 from i 3 's (in)direct exclusion power (Figure 3(b) ). Neither agent's allocation depends on i 3 's endowment.
x 2 x 3 i 3 (b) Agent i 3 lacks direct or indirect exclusion rights to x 1 at σ. Figure 3 : An allocation that cannot be destabilized through indirect exclusion.
The next theorem generalizes Theorem 1 of Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) . It is implied by Theorem 3 (stated below), which concerns a more general model. Theorem 1. The exclusion core of an exchange economy where the endowment system satisfies (A1)-(A4) is not empty.
Our interest in the exclusion core stems from its conceptual origins in property rights (the right to exclude in particular) and its sensitivity to the network of trades. However, it has many properties in an exchange economy that further elevate its appeal. For example, all exclusion core allocations are Pareto efficient. 7 In Shapley and Scarf's (1974) "house exchange" economy, a seminal special case, the exclusion core equals the strong core, a consensus selection. 8
Unlike the strong core, the exclusion core characterizes a generalization of the TTC algorithm in exchange economies with private and public ownership (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019) .
Production Economies
To generalize the exclusion core solution to a production economy, we rely on critical inputs to transmit exclusion and hold-up threats through a production network.
Definition 4. The set Z ⊆ X is critical for the production of x given the production network γ if x can be produced by firm f with inputs γ(f ) and x cannot be produced by f with inputs
Any coalition controlling a critical set of inputs for x can exclude others from x by holdingup its production. This observation has significant consequences when coupled with the logic of Section 3. As motivation, consider the outcome illustrated in Figure 4 . All goods are privately owned, except x 2 , which is owned collectively. Consider i 1 . He owns x 1 , which is a critical input for x 2 . Even though x 2 is collectively owned, i 1 can block its production through his 7 Condition (b) in Definition 3 holds vacuously if everyone is (weakly) better off. Pareto efficiency follows. 8 In Shapley and Scarf's model, there are n agents and n goods. Each agent i k owns one good, ω(i k ) = {x k }, and x ≻ i k x 0 for all x = x 0 and all i k . See also our discussion in Section 5.1 concerning the TTC algorithm. Figure 4 : An outcome where i 1 has (in)direct exclusion rights to all four goods.
control of x 1 . Going further, x 2 is a critical input for x 3 . Thus, i 1 can block access to x 3 through his indirect control of a critical input. Since i 1 can block the production of x 3 , by virtue of the reasoning from Section 3 he can press i 2 to exclude i 3 from x 4 . In sum, we have argued that i 1 has indirect exclusion power over all four goods.
To formalize the preceding reasoning in the general case, we first derive a new characterization of a coalition's extended endowment in an exchange economy (Definition 2). The reformulation simplifies accounting as consumption (and, in the sequel, production) dependencies are traced through the economy.
Lemma 1.
If Ω(C |ω, µ) is the extended endowment of coalition C in an exchange economy at allocation µ, then
for each k ≥ 1.
Next we generalize (1a) and (1b) accounting for critical production links. Let α γ (Z ) be the set of goods for which Z is a critical set of inputs at γ. If x ∈ α γ (Z ), then x is directly reliant on Z at γ. We append α γ (·) to each iteration of (1b). Thus, the extended endowment of coalition C (in a production economy) at (µ, γ) is
where Z 0 := ω(C ) and
for each k ≥ 1. In a production economy, a coalition acquires (indirect) exclusion rights to a good through both consumption and production dependencies.
We can now define exclusion blocking in a production economy by plugging Ω γ (·|ω, µ) into part (b) of Definition 3. However, one subtlety remains. It is not obvious when or if a blocking coalition can change a firm's operation. For example, suppose firm f produces {x , y } and coalition C includes all members of C x but not C y . Can the coalition tell the firm to shut down? When can a coalition demand that a shuttered firm start production? Similar questions arise when defining the (regular) core in a production economy and there are no unequivocal answers. 9 Accordingly, we propose two definitions that bracket most, if not all, plausible proposals. The "ex post" exclusion core posits agents take firms' production plans as given. The "ex ante" exclusion core allows blocking coalitions to change all production plans freely. We investigate each variant in turn.
The Ex Post Exclusion Core
Definition 5. Coalition C ⊆ I can ex post exclusion block the outcome (µ, γ) if there exists a
The ex post exclusion core is the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be ex post exclusion blocked by any nonempty coalition. In Definition 5, a blocking coalition takes the production network as given. The notion captures a short-run disruption wherein firms cannot easily retool or establish new production relationships. For intuition, imagine firms initially cement inter-firm links by committing to a production network. Subsequently, agents coordinate on a consumption allocation. If all feasible consumption allocations can be ex post exclusion blocked, the production network is unambiguously incredible. Anticipation of ex post opportunism may even curse all parties to settle for a "no production" outcome. In fact, if the economy's endowment system satisfies (A1)-(A4), there always exists an ex post exclusion core outcome with an empty production network, γ(f ) = ∅ for all f ∈ F . Without production, only primary goods exist and Theorem 1 applies.
When does a nontrivial production network γ support an ex post exclusion core outcome?
To answer this question, we first examine the production network's critical connections. Recall that α γ (·) identifies the goods directly reliant on any set of inputs. Iterating this mapping gives the indirectly reliant goods. For any Z ⊆ X , the set of goods indirectly reliant on Z at γ is
A k
x 1
x 2
x 3 x 4
x 5
x 6 Figure 5 : The production network γ. If x k x ℓ , then x k is produced using x ℓ .
where A 0 := Z and A k :
, then x is directly or indirectly reliant on Z and no proper subset of Z has this property. When Z = {z }, we suppress the braces by writing z ∈ Λ γ (x ).
To better understand λ γ (·) and Λ γ (·), first note that (by definition)
for all x ∈ X , including primary goods and goods that are not produced at γ. Second, λ γ (·) and
is a singleton (the proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3(a)-(b) in Appendix D). Now consider the production network γ illustrated in Figure 5 . Each good is "pointing" to the inputs used in its production, if any. If γ is efficient, then y ∈ λ γ (x ) if and only if there is a path in the
there is a path in the graph from x to y . Thus, Λ γ (x 4 ) = {x 4 , x 5 , x 6 }. 11
The interaction between critical inputs and the economy's endowment system is at the heart of the following theorem. We discuss its interpretation below.
Theorem 2. Let = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4). Let γ ∈ Γ and suppose
for all x ∈ X . There exists an allocation µ such that (µ, γ) is an ex post exclusion core outcome.
Condition (3) holds for all primary goods and for all goods that are not produced at γ. 12
10 Per convention, a single vertex is a length zero path that begins and ends at itself. Thus, x 4 ∈ λ γ (x 4 ). 11 To simplify, we omit the braces for singleton elements. A complementary representation of λ γ (·) and Λ γ (·) is available in terms of the economy's "Leontief inverse" matrix, which can be expressed as an infinite sum of powers of the production network's adjacency matrix. Details of this interpretation are available from the authors upon request.
12 If x is a primary good or a good that is not produced at γ, then no set of inputs is critical for x . Therefore,
Thus, (3) reduces to C x = ∅, which holds by (A4).
The first term, C x , is good x 's principals. The second term concerns the intermediate goods in x 's supply chain. Thus, (3) holds at x when the principals of each critical set of (indirect) inputs overlap with the principals of x . Intuitively, there is "sufficient integration" in the supply chain's ownership structure to neuter any hold-up risk due to misaligned interests.
Three observations are pertinent. First, condition (3) does not imply full integration of the supply chain's ownership. It is a much weaker postulate. If z is the only critical input for
x and C x = {i 1 , i 2 } and C z = {i 2 , i 3 }, then the supply chain is sufficiently integrated. Even though i 2 does not own x or z outright, he has sufficient power to neutralize hold-up risk.
Second, condition (3) is independent of agents' preferences. Therefore, it is predicated on a "worst-case" scenario with misaligned interests. If agents' preferences do not conflict, an ex post exclusion core outcome obtains under weaker institutional conditions. Third, the ex post exclusion core becomes larger as the economy shifts away from private property or toward a less efficient production network. Proofs of the following propositions are omitted. They follow from the monotonicity of Ω γ (·|ω, µ) in ω and γ.
Proposition 2. Let (µ, γ) be an ex post exclusion core outcome in = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉. Consider
belongs to the ex post exclusion core of .
In Proposition 2, the production network γ is more efficient than γ ′ since it assures the same output with fewer inputs. Intuitively, each input's importance at γ is amplified and its owners have greater (indirect) exclusion power, thus narrowing the ex post exclusion core's size.
The Ex Ante Exclusion Core
Definition 6 differs from Definition 5 in one way-the production network can change freely. The ex ante exclusion core is the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be ex ante exclusion blocked by any nonempty coalition. Every outcome in the ex ante exclusion core is Pareto optimal 13 and belongs to the ex post exclusion core.
The ex ante exclusion core can be empty without further restrictions on the environment.
We focus on a class of economies where each firm has a unique efficient production plan. In our model, this is equivalent to the case of input complementarities. Firm f has a Leontief production function if there exists a set of inputs
Production processes with complementarities are salient at the granularity and disaggregation implicit in our model. Even minor input substitutions can result in a distinct final product if goods are defined sufficiently narrowly. Production complementarities are important for trade patterns (Grossman et al., 2005) and economic growth (Kremer, 1993; Jones, 2011) . Both topics are natural applications of our theory emphasizing exclusion rights and hold up.
each firm has a Leontief production function,
There exists an ex ante exclusion core outcome in .
Assumption (B1) was discussed above. Assumption (B2) ensures that it is feasible to produce all goods. This assumption is analogous to Assumption V in Arrow and Debreu (1954, p. 280) that assures an excess supply of all goods can be achieved by some production plan. It does not imply that all goods are available for consumption or that γ is the production network at an exclusion core outcome. Assumption (B3) is the same as (3) in Theorem 2, but evaluated only at γ. Theorem 1 is a corollary of Theorem 3; (B1)-(B3) are moot or trivially satisfied if all goods are primary.
Proof of Theorem 3
This section explains the key economic insights from the proof of Theorem 3 (see Appendix D). The proof has two parts. Part I constructs an ex ante exclusion core outcome in an acyclic economy (defined below). Part II extends this result to any economy satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 3 by identifying a mapping between it and a corresponding acyclic economy.
Part I -Top Trading Cycles and Acyclic Economies
To prove Theorem 3, we first construct an outcome in an economy satisfying the theorem's hypotheses using a generalized TTC algorithm. Before tackling the details, we highlight the guiding principle behind our generalization. In Shapley and Scarf's (1974) model, the classic TTC algorithm identifies the unique exclusion core outcome (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019) . In this special case, there is no production and each agent owns exactly one item. The TTC algorithm proceeds as follows. Each good "points" to its owner and each agent "points"
to his favorite item. Necessarily, there is a cycle of alternating goods and agents. Each agent in the cycle leaves the market with the good to which he is pointing. Then, the process iterates with each remaining agent pointing to his favorite still-available item. Notice that with each iteration the set of available goods shrinks and goods never return to the market. In step 1, every good is available. At step 2, all goods except those cleared in step 1 are available.
And so on. Theorem 3's assumptions let us define a similarly-monotone assignment process.
Successive cycles define agents' consumption allocations and firms' input use. A novel "cycle trimming" procedure arbitrates agent-firm conflicts to ensure compatibility of consumption assignments and the supply chains necessary for production. We explain this feature's economic intuition below.
The algorithm requires two preliminary definitions. The production network
Algorithm 1. Given = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉, construct the outcome (µ, γ) in a series of steps. In step t ≥ 1, the algorithm proceeds as follows with inputs (I t , F t , X t 0 ). I t is the set of unassigned agents, F t is the set of unassigned firms, and X t 0 is the set of primary and previously-produced goods with remaining capacity. Let I 1 := I , F 1 := F , and X 1 0 := X 0 .
Step t Let X t :
0 -and proceed to step t + 1. Otherwise, from each i ∈ I t there is a link to some x ∈ X t . Since each agent is "pointing" to a good and each good is "pointing" to an agent, there exists a cycle of alternating agents and goods. (A cycle may be formed by one agent and one good.) If there are multiple cycles, they are disjoint and we may focus on any of them. Let K be that cycle.
Given K , pick any two distinct goods x , y ∈ K ∩ X t such that x ∈ Λ γ t (y ). If there are no such goods, continue to (⋆) below. Otherwise, iterate the following operation to define a new cycle until it contains no distinct goods x and y such that x ∈ Λ γ t (y ).
Cycle Trimming. Since x and y belong to the same cycle, these goods are pointing to different agents. Say, x → i and y → j . Delete the arc from x to i and draw a new arc from x to j , thus defining the new cycle K ′ ⊆ K . The new cycle K ′ does not contain good y or agent i .
(⋆) Given the identified cycle K , perform the following assignments.
(a) If i → x in the cycle, set µ(i ) = x . LetĨ t be the set of agents whose assignment has just been defined. Let I t +1 := I t \Ĩ t be the set of agents for whom µ(·) is yet undefined.
0 is either a produced good that is assigned to an agent in (a) or a produced good that is an (indirect) input for a good that is assigned to an agent in (a). This good's producer, say f , belongs to F t . Accordingly, for each such firm define
LetF t be the set of firms whose input assignment has just been defined.
be the set of goods assigned to agents or firms in parts (a) and (b) whose capacity has been depleted. Let X t +1 0 := (X t 0 ∪ fF t (γ t )) \X t be the set of primary goods or goods produced up to step t with remaining capacity.
The cycle before trimming.
x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4
The cycle after trimming. Figure 6 : The cycle trimming procedure.
firms that are assigned no inputs atγ t . For each f ∈F t , assign γ(f ) = ∅ and denote the set of these firms' (henceforth, not produced)
the set of firms for which γ(·) is still undefined.
Given the newly defined parameters,
), proceed to step t + 1.
The above procedure continues until I t = ∅. At this point, µ(·) has been defined for all i ∈ I and γ(·) has been defined for all
Since there is a finite number of agents and at least one agent is assigned in each step, Algorithm 1 terminates in a finite number of steps. An example in Appendix C illustrates the algorithm's operation. Next, we address two topics related to the feasibility of the outcome constructed by Algorithm 1.
Cycle Trimming A distinctive feature of Algorithm 1 is the cycle trimming procedure. To understand this step's importance consider Figure 6 (a), which illustrates a cycle arising at some step t . Each good is pointing to an agent and each agent is pointing to a good. Suppose, as illustrated by the dashed arrows, there is a supply chain at γ t -x 4 is reliant on x 3 , x 3 is reliant on x 2 , etc. If x 2 has capacity one, the cyclic assignment is infeasible. If x 3 is produced for i 2 's consumption, it needs x 2 as an input. Thus, x 2 cannot be consumed by i 4 , as required by the cycle. The cycle trimming procedure resolves this conflict. Since x 2 ∈ Λ γ t (x 3 ), the procedure has x 2 point to i 3 instead of i 1 . A new cycle without x 3 is formed ( Figure 6(b) ). The new cycle's implied allocation is feasible.
The economics of the cycle trimming procedure are interesting. Intuitively, the operation cuts out goods with "long" supply chains. A preference for "short" supply chains is warranted given the underlying premise of exclusion blocking. If good x is a critical (indirect) input for y , then the owners of x have leverage over good y 's assignment. Expansive supply chains introduce many input dependencies, thereby amplifying hold-up risk. Thus, the trading protocol steers the market toward less-complex and more robust production arrangements.
Production Cycles Cycle trimming contributes to the feasibility of Algorithm 1's output. However, it is not sufficient. Cyclic input-output relationships among firms remain a concern. For example, a coal mine supplies a power plant and simultaneously uses the generated electricity. Algorithm 1's output may be infeasible in such cases.
A simple solution to the production-cycles problem is to (temporarily) assume it away.
Consider an economy where every firm's production function satisfies (4). The economy's input network is a directed graph Φ where the set of nodes is F and there is a directed edge
The economy is acyclic if its input network is acyclic. Acyclic input networks describe supply chains with well-defined "upstream" and "downstream" firms. Acyclicity is commonly assumed in studies of production and trading networks (Ostrovsky, 2008; Manea, 2018; Kotowski and Leister, 2019) . If is acyclic and satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 3, then Algorithm 1 identifies a feasible, ex ante exclusion core outcome (Lemmas 9 and 10 in Appendix D).
Part II -Condensation and Firm Boundaries
To extend our analysis beyond the acyclic case, we rely on the graph-theoretic concept of a condensation (Bondy and Murty, 2008, pp. 91-92) . graph. An acyclic graph's condensation is the graph itself.
We adapt the idea of a condensation of a directed graph to define the condensation of an economy , denoted asˆ = 〈Î ,F ,X ,≻,ω〉 (Definition 8 in Appendix D). Intuitively, the concept involves "merging" the firms in each strongly connected component of the economy's input network. 17 For example, in Figure 7 {f 3 , f 4 , f 5 } becomesf 3 . The merged firm's "internal" input-output dependencies cancel out leaving only its "external" factor demand/supply relationships intact.ˆ is an acyclic economy that satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 3. It has an ex ante exclusion core outcome that implies existence of an ex ante exclusion core outcome in the original economy (see the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix D).
The economic interpretation of a condensation depends on the granularity captured by the original economy . At the (extreme) micro-level, strongly connected components define firm boundaries. Posit that each "firm" in is a discrete production task. Closely-related tasks tend to be integrated within a single organization, if only to save on coordination and transaction costs (Coase, 1937) . 
Multisourcing
What kinds of production networks are consistent with ex ante exclusion core outcomes?
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 3, each ex ante exclusion core outcome is consumptionequivalent to one with an efficient production network.
Proposition 3. Let be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1) with ex ante exclusion core outcome (µ, γ). There exists an efficient production networkγ such that (µ,γ) is an ex ante exclusion core outcome in .
In general, however, an inefficient production network may be necessary to support a particular consumption allocation as an ex ante exclusion core outcome. Engaging redundant inputs can insulate a firm from hold-up threats. The supply-chain practice of multisourcing demonstrates this idea in practice.
Example 1. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } and X = {x 1 , . . ., x 5 }. Good x 1 is produced according to the production function
The remaining goods are primary goods. The agents' preferences are
This economy has several ex ante exclusion core outcomes. Of particular interest is
where x 1 is produced using both inputs. Such multisourcing insulates i 1 from challenges by i 2 and i 3 . Both want to claim x 1 , but neither has the ability to do so.
Price Equilibrium
A connection exists between trading cycle algorithms and price equilibria (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Richter and Rubinstein, 2015) . In our model, feasible outcomes identified by Algorithm 1 can be decentralized via the price system. We let p ∈ |X ∪{x 0 }| + denote a price vector; p x is the price of good x . The next definition adapts a definition of Debreu (1959, p. 93 ).
Definition 7. The outcome (µ * , γ * ) is an equilibrium relative to the price system p * if
Conditions (b) and (c) are standard requirements concerning profit-maximization by firms and feasibility, respectively. Condition (a) describes consumer behavior and requires elaboration. Recall that an endowment system ω(·) defines a distribution of exclusion rights, which can be very general. When agents lack a private endowment or goods are controlled collectively, it is unclear how to define personal budget sets without further ad hoc assumptions. 18
Definition 7(a) sidesteps this difficulty. If agent i prefers x to his consumption choice µ * (i ), then x must be more expensive than µ * (i ). This is an immediate implication of utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. 19
Proposition 4. Let be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3) where each good has capacity one. There exists an ex ante exclusion core outcome (µ * , γ * ) and a price vector p * such that (µ * , γ * ) is an equilibrium relative to p * .
Corollary 1. Let be an acyclic economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3) where each good has capacity one. If (µ * , γ * ) is an outcome identified by Algorithm 1, then there exists a price vector p * such that (µ * , γ * ) is an equilibrium relative to p * .
If there are goods with infinite capacity (i.e., public goods), then it is straightforward to adapt the proof of Proposition 4 to construct an equilibrium with personalized prices (i.e., the Lindahl equilibrium analogue of Definition 7).
Related Literature and Concluding Remarks
Our study contributes to the literatures on property rights and economic organization, and trading and production networks. We conclude by discussing each contribution.
Property Rights and Economic Organization
The interplay between property rights and economic organization has received considerable attention (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967) . Most recent treatments of this question build upon the incomplete contracts framework of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . Our model's technical scaffold differs substantially from this literature. We start with one defining principle of property, the right to exclude, and we trace out its implications in an economy with general interdependencies.
Exclusion rights allow an agent to withhold the supply of goods, thus tilting outcomes in his favor. This monopoly dimension of property is well known; Posner and Weyl (2018) discuss its implications at length. In a production context, it often implies hold-up and inefficiency. Our analysis shows that this effect has consequences beyond a specific buyer-seller relationship, 18 Simply introducing ownership shares is unsatisfactory since it is not obvious how share endowments (should) interact with ω(·). 19 For Definition 7(a) we could instead write that for all
the focus of standard contract-theoretic studies, due to the network structure of economic activity. Changes to the ownership structure (e.g., vertical integration) can allay these concerns (Williamson, 1971; Klein et al., 1978; Kranton and Minehart, 2000) .
Despite differences with the incomplete contracts literature, our analysis is thematically related to that of Hart and Moore (1990) and Moore's model and, we argue, are critical whenever exclusion rights govern interaction.
Production and Trading Networks Analysis of the economy's network structure dates to at least the input-output models of Leontief (1941) . Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2019) survey this literature, with focus on how production networks propagate economic shocks. Our model's specifics distinguish it from this macro-and trade-oriented literature, but we share the premise that direct and indirect trading and input-output relationships transmit shocks between firms. Our solution relies on agents being able to threaten harm to (indirectly) connected parties by withholding supply (a negative shock).
The relationship between network structures and economic outcomes has been examined in the literature on trading networks and intermediation (Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Gale and Kariv, 2007; Elliott, 2015; Condorelli et al., 2017; Manea, 2018) . Galeotti and Condorelli (2016) provide a survey. A consistent finding in this literature is that an agent's market power is tied to his position in the trading network. Our model echoes this intuition. If a good is a critical input for many firms, either directly or indirectly via a supply chain, its owners can block many unfavorable outcomes.
Finally, our analysis complements research by Ostrovsky (2008) , Hatfield et al. (2013) , and A conceptual contrast is also noteworthy. At a high level, the matching with contracts framework builds upon Gale and Shapley's (1962) "marriage market" model. Our model's technical roots are in Shapley and Scarf's (1974) "house exchange" economy. This difference is intriguing given the former's emphasis on contracts and the latter's connection to property (as argued above). The contracts-property dichotomy is a recognized, though fluid, distinction in legal analysis. 20 It is interesting, therefore, that two seminal models of markets have two different legal institutions in their foundations. We leave it to future research to characterize this distinction's implications for both the design and operation of markets.
A Appendix: Scalable Production
Our model assumes that a firm f produces ∅ or X f . This framework embeds scalable production. To illustrate, suppose a firm produces two units of output, x 1 and x 2 . Production of the first unit requires one input, y 1 , while production of the second unit requires the additional inputs y 2 and y 3 . Intuitively, this firm has decreasing returns to scale. To embed this situation in our model, posit there are two firms, f 1 and f 2 , with production functions
The first unit x 1 is produced using y 1 as an input. Production of x 1 also creates a token x * .
Production of the second unit x 2 requires inputs y 2 and y 3 and the token x * . The latter ensures that good x 2 is produced only if good x 1 is also produced. (Else, x * would not be available.)
The token chains together the operation of f 1 and f 2 as if they form one entity that can scale output. The preceding construction can be repeated as required. Increasing and decreasing returns to scale production can be accommodated.
B Appendix: Consumption of Multiple Goods
Our model assumes that agents have unit demand. Discrete exchange economies where an agent can consume multiple goods are ill behaved, with few positive results (Konishi et al., 2001) . We can incorporate this case via a reinterpretation of "goods" and production by "firms."
To sketch the argument, assume agent i prefers an apple (x a ) to a banana (x b ), but his mostpreferred consumption choice is to have both an apple and a banana,
This preference lies outside our model. Let f be an agent-specific firm that transforms an apple and a banana into an agent-specific, apple-banana composite good (x i a b ) according to the production function
The good x i a b is essentially a relabeling of {x a , x b } and, therefore, it is natural to conclude that agent i 's preference would be x i a b ≻ i x a ≻ i x b . The preceding preference is within our framework. We can replicate the preceding construction for all agents as required.
C Appendix: Operation of Algorithm 1
To illustrate Algorithm 1's operation, consider the following economy = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉. The set of goods is X = {x 1 , . . ., x 6 }. All goods have unit capacity. Goods {x 1 , . . ., x 4 } are produced by the firms. Goods {x 5 , x 6 } are primary goods. There are three firms, F = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 }, with production functions
An output of f 3 is an input for f 1 . There are three agents, I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 }, with preferences
Each good's principals are:
The endowment system ω(·) is given by x ∈ ω(C ) ⇐⇒ C x ⊆ C . Thus, goods x 5 and x 6 are collectively owned. Goods x 3 and x 4 have disjoint sets of principals despite being produced by the same firm.
Step 2. Figure 8: Step-by-step operation of Algorithm 1. Figure 8 illustrates the algorithm's step-by-step operation.
Step 1. The algorithm initializes with I 1 = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 }, F 1 = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 }, and X 1 0 = {x 5 , x 6 }. The maximal, efficient (X 1 0 , F 1 )-feasible production network is γ 1 (f 1 ) = x 3 , γ 1 (f 2 ) = x 5 , and γ 1 (f 3 ) = x 6 . Thus, X 1 = {x 1 , . . ., x 6 }. The initial directed graph constructed in step 1 is illustrated in Figure 8 (a). There is one cycle, but its implied allocation is infeasible. (Good x 3 is assigned to i 2 as a consumption good; it is also an input for x 1 .) The cycle trimming procedure reassigns x 3 to point to i 2 . This is because x 3 ∈ Λ γ 1 (x 1 ) and x 1 → i 2 . Figure 8(b) illustrates this adjustment.
The resulting cycle (i 2 ⇄ x 3 ) determines this step's assignments as follows:
(a) Agent i 2 is assigned x 3 : µ(i 2 ) = x 3 . Thus,Ĩ 1 = {i 2 } and I 2 = {i 1 , i 3 }.
(b) Good x 3 must be produced by f 3 . Thus, the firm is assigned its requisite input: γ(f 3 ) = γ 1 (f 3 ) = x 6 .F 1 = {f 3 }. Coincidentally, f 3 also produces x 4 , which is henceforth available.
(c) The set of assigned goods with depleted capacity isX 1 = {x 3 , x 6 }. The set of primary or produced goods with remaining capacity is X 2 0 = {x 4 , x 5 }.
(d) The maximal, efficient (X 2 0 , {f 1 , f 2 })-feasible production network isγ 1 (f 1 ) = ∅ andγ 1 (f 2 ) = x 5 . Thus, firm f 1 cannot produce given the defined allocation. Hence,F 1 = {f 1 } andX 1 = {x 1 }. Therefore, γ(f 1 ) = ∅ and F 2 = {f 2 }.
Step 2. At the start of step 2, I 2 = {i 1 , i 3 }, F 2 = {f 2 }, and X 2 0 = {x 4 , x 5 }. The maximal, efficient (X 2 0 , F 2 )-feasible production network is γ 2 (f 2 ) = x 5 and X 2 = {x 2 , x 4 , x 5 }. Figure 8(c) presents the directed graph constructed at the beginning of step 2. There is one cycle and its implied allocation is feasible. The step's assignments are defined as follows:
(a) Agent i 1 receives x 4 (µ(i 1 ) = x 4 ) and i 3 receives x 2 (µ(i 3 ) = x 2 ). Thus,Ĩ 2 = {i 1 , i 3 } and I 3 = ∅.
(b) Firm f 2 produces x 2 and receives its requisite input: γ(f 2 ) = γ 2 (f 2 ) = x 5 .F 2 = {f 2 }.
(c) The set of assigned goods with depleted capacity isX 2 = {x 2 , x 4 , x 5 }. The set of primary or produced goods with remaining capacity is X 3 0 = ∅.
(d) As F 2 \F 2 = ∅, assignment phase (d) is unnecessary.
Since I 3 = ∅, the algorithm terminates after step 2. The final outcome is (µ, γ) where µ(i 1 ) = x 4 ,
D Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
We make two preliminary observations. First, since C k ⊆ C k +1 and
for each k ≥ 1. We can prove this fact by induction. The base case is true since
To prove the lemma it suffices to show that
The proof of Theorem 2 invokes the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4). Let (µ, γ) be a feasible outcome and C ⊆ I . LetŻ −1 = ∅ and for each k ≥ 0, recursively defineŻ k :
Proof of Lemma 2. If k = 0, (5) becomes λ γ (ω(C )) ⊇ α γ (ω(C ) ). This statement is true because
Let k ≥ 1 and working toward a contradiction assume that
Since λ γ (Z ) ⊇ α γ (Z ), (7) implies
Together, (6) and (8) imply that there exists a nonempty Y (7).
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix = 〈I , F, X , ≻, ω〉. Suppose γ ∈ Γ satisfies (3). Consider the exchange economy˙ = 〈İ ,Ẋ ,≻,ω〉 derived from as follows:
It is clear thatω satisfies assumptions (A1)-(A3). To verify (A4), observe that
Line (9) is because C z ⊆ C for all z ∈ ω(C ) (by (A4)). And so, z ∈ω(C ) C z ⊆ C . Line (10) follows
Theorem 1 implies that˙ has an exclusion core allocation, µ.
Next, observe that (µ, γ) is feasible in . This is because µ: I →Ẋ ∪ {x 0 } only assigns goods that are available given the firms' input assignments and output. To verify that (µ, γ) is in the ex post exclusion core of , it suffices to show that Ω γ (C |ω, µ)∩Ẋ ⊆ Ω (C |ω, µ) where Ω (C |ω, µ) is defined in (1a,b) and Ω γ (C |ω, µ) is defined in (2a,b) .
Line (11) follows from Lemma 2. Line (12) follows from the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of ω, µ −1 , and α γ . Line (13) 
. (Only available goods may be assigned or be part of a critical set of inputs.)
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on several lemmas. Lemmas 3-8 are preliminaries invoked in subsequent arguments. Lemma 9 shows that Algorithm 1's output is feasible and Lemma 10 demonstrates that it is in the ex ante exclusion core of an acyclic economy. Definition 8 introduces the condensation of an economy. Each condensed economy has an ex ante exclusion core outcome (Lemma 11). Theorem 3's proof concludes by using Lemma 11 to show that every economy satisfying the theorem's hypotheses has an ex ante exclusion core outcome.
Lemma 3. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1). Let Z ⊆ X , γ ∈ Γ ,
(a) If a K ∈ A K and a K / ∈ A K −1 , then there exists a sequence (a K , a K −1 , . . ., a 0 ) such that a k ∈ A k for each k ≥ 0 and a k ∈ α γ (a k −1 ) for each k ≥ 1.
(b) For all x ∈ X , every Z ∈ Λ γ (x ) consists of a single element.
(c) If z ∈ Λ γ (y ) and y ∈ Λ γ (x ), then z ∈ Λ γ (x ).
(f) Suppose F k is a strongly connected component of the economy's input network
Proof of Lemma 3. (a) Suppose a K ∈ A K and a K / ∈ A K −1 . Thus, a K ∈ α γ (A K −1 ) and A K −1 is critical for x at γ. Since each firm's production function in Leontief, a K ∈ α γ (a K −1 ) for some
which is assumed not true). Repeating this same construction, we can define a sequence (a K , a K −1 , . . ., a 1 , a 0 ) such that a k ∈ A k for each k and a k ∈ α γ (a k −1 ).
(e) Suppose x = y and y ∈ Λ γ (x ). Thus, x ∈ λ γ (y ). Given part (a), there exists a sequence of goods (a K , . . ., a 0 ) such that x = a K , y = a 0 and a k ∈ α γ (a k −1 ) for all k ≥ 1. Because production functions are Leontief, there is a link from the firm producing a k to the firm producing a k −1 in Φ. Hence, there is a path in Φ from the producer of x to the producer of y . If x ∈ Λ γ (y ), then the same reasoning implies that there exists a path in Φ from the producer of y to the producer of x . As Φ is acyclic, this is impossible. Thus, x / ∈ Λ γ (y ).
This good is critical for the production of all x ′ ∈ X f L−1 . Continuing in this way, we can construct a sequence y ℓ ∈ X f ℓ ∩ W f ℓ−1 for all ℓ ≥ 2 where y ℓ is a critical input for firm f ℓ−1 's production.
Thus, x = y 1 ∈ α γ (y 2 ), y 2 ∈ α γ (y 3 ), . . ., y L ∈ α γ (y ). Thus, x ∈ λ γ (y ) and, therefore, y ∈ Λ γ (x ).
Lemma 4. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1). Let (µ, γ) be a feasible outcome and C ⊆ I .
Proof of Lemma 4. If x ∈ Z 0 , then x ∈ ω(C ) and x ∈ Λ γ (x ). Proceeding by induction, let k ≥ 1
There are three cases.
Case 1. If x ∈ Z k −1 , then by the induction hypothesis there exists 1 ) ), then the conclusion follows trivially (x = y ).
Case 3. If x ∈ α γ (Z k −1 ), then Z k −1 is a critical set of inputs for x . By (B1), there exists some
x ′ ∈ Z k −1 that is a critical input for x , i.e., x ′ ∈ Λ γ (x ). By the induction hypothesis, there
Lemma 3(c) implies that y ∈ Λ γ (x ).
Lemma 5. Consider an economy = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 satisfying (B1) and (B2). Let X ′ ⊆ X and F ′ ⊆ F . A maximal, efficient (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible production network exists and is unique.
Proof of Lemma 5. The empty production network (i.e., γ(f ) = ∅ for all f ∈ F ′ ) is efficient and (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible. Thus, a maximal, efficient (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible production network exists. To show uniqueness, let γ = γ ′ be maximal, efficient (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible production networks. Let
The networkγ is efficient because γ and γ ′ are efficient and each firm has a Leontief production function. (A producing firm must be assigned a unique set of inputs; a non-producing firm must be assigned no inputs.) Sinceγ ⊇ γ andγ = γ,γ must not be (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible. Since γ and γ ′ are (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible,γ(F ′ ) ⊆ X ′ ∪ f F ′ (γ). Therefore, there exists a good x such that |{f ∈ F ′ |x ∈γ(f )}| > q x . Since each production function is Leontief, there are strictly more than q x firms in F ′ that require x as an input. At least one of these firms cannot produce at γ, contradicting (B2).
Lemma 6. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3). Let X ′ ⊆ X and F ′ ⊆ F . If γ is an (X ′ , F ′ )-feasible production network, then C (
Proof of Lemma 6. By Lemma 3(b), C (x |γ) = z ∈Λ γ (x ) C z for all γ. By (B3), C (x |γ) = z ∈Λ γ (x ) C z = ∅. Therefore, to prove the lemma it suffices to show that
. (We include the γ superscript on A γ k for clarity.) By Lemma 3(a), there exists a sequence (a K , a K −1 , . . ., a 0 ) such that x = a K , a 0 = z , and a k = α γ (a k −1 ) for each k ≥ 1.
Since production functions are Leontief, if a k −1 is critical for a k at γ, it must be critical for a k at γ. Thus, a k = α γ (a k −1 ) for each k ≥ 1. Hence, a 0 ∈ A γ 0 and a k ∈ A
Lemma 7. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3). Consider step t of Algorithm 1 where γ t is the maximal, efficient (X t 0 , F t )-feasible production network and C (x ) = C (x |γ t ) ∩ I t . Let K 1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ K L be the sequence of cycles identified by iterating the "cycle trimming" procedure within this step of the algorithm. Let x , y ∈ K ℓ ∩ X , x ∈ Λ γ t (y ), and suppose x → i and y → j within cycle K ℓ . Suppose the procedure reassigns x to point to j at iteration ℓ.
(a) If j ∈ C (y ), then j ∈ C (x ).
The term in parenthesis is not empty by Lemma 6. The proof is by induction. Consider cycle K 1 . Let x , y ∈ K 1 ∩ X ,
x ∈ Λ γ t (y ), and suppose x → i and y → j within cycle K 1 . Suppose the procedure reassigns
x to point to j . Since x ∈ Λ γ t (y ), z ∈Λ γ t (y ) C z ⊆ z ∈Λ γ t (x ) C z by Lemma 3(d). Thus, if j ∈ C (y ),
then j ∈ C (x ). Otherwise, if j / ∈ C (y ), then C (y ) = ∅. Thus, all i ′ ∈ z ∈Λ γ t (y ) C z must have been assigned prior to step t .
Proceeding by induction, suppose statements (a) and (b) of the lemma are true for all cycles K 1 , . . ., K ℓ−1 . Let x , y ∈ K ℓ ∩ X , x ∈ Λ γ t (y ), and suppose x → i and y → j within cycle K ℓ . Suppose the procedure reassigns x to point to j . If j ∈ C (y ), then j ∈ C (x ) as above.
Otherwise, j / ∈ C (y ) and there are two cases.
Case 1. C (y ) = ∅. Thus, all i ′ ∈ z ∈Λ γ t (y ) C z have been assigned prior to step t .
Case 2. C (y ) = ∅. Because y is not pointing to an element of C (y ), it must have been reassigned to point to j in some prior iteration ℓ ′ < ℓ of the cycle trimming procedure.
Suppose at iteration ℓ ′ , x ′ → j and y ∈ Λ γ t (x ′ ). Invoking the induction hypothesis, if j ∈ C (x ′ ), then j ∈ C (y ), a contradiction. Thus, j / ∈ C (x ′ ) and there exists an
y ) C z who was assigned by the algorithm in step t ′ < t .
Lemma 8. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3) . Let (µ, γ) be a feasible outcome identified by Algorithm 1. Suppose agent j was assigned good y at step t of Algorithm 1. For every x ∈ Λ γ (y ), there exists i ∈ C x who was assigned his consumption allocation in step t or earlier.
Proof of Lemma 8. Let x ∈ Λ γ (y ). Because good y was assigned in step t , good x must be produced in step s ≤ t . (If x is a primary good, s = 1.) Let K be the final cycle identified by Algorithm 1 in step s that determines the consumption assignments of agents. There exists a good
there are three possibilities.
If x ′ was pointing to an agent not in C (x ′ ), it is because during the trimming procedure in step s it was reassigned to point to agent i ′ . By Lemma
In each case, there is a member of C x assigned in or before step t .
Lemma 9. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an acyclic economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1). The outcome (µ, γ) identified by Algorithm 1 is feasible.
Proof of Lemma 9. It suffices to show that if a good is assigned to agent i in step t of Algorithm 1, then it is not simultaneously assigned to any firm. 22 Assume the contrary. Suppose y is assigned to an agent and to a firm in step t . If y is a produced good, then it cannot be assigned to the firm that produces y (γ t is efficient and y is not a necessary input for itself). Thus, there exists x = y such that y ∈ Λ γ t (x ). If good x is assigned to an agent at step t , then both x and y belong to the cycle determining the consumption assignment at step t . However, this violates the trimming procedure's stopping criterion. Therefore, x is not assigned to another agent at 22 The other possibilities are ruled out by the definition of Algorithm 1 and the feasibly of γ t . step t . But this implies x ∈ Λ γ t (x ′ ) for some x ′ that is assigned to an agent at step t . By Lemma 3(b) and (c), y ∈ Λ γ t (x ′ ). Thus, if x ′ = y , we arrive at a contradiction, as above. If x ′ = y , then we contradict Lemma 3(e), which invokes acyclicity, because x = y , y ∈ Λ γ t (x ), and x ∈ Λ γ t (y ).
As each case leads to a contradiction, we conclude that no good is assigned to an agent and to a firm in step t .
Lemma 10. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an acyclic economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3).
Proof of Lemma 10. Let (µ, γ) be an outcome identified by Algorithm 1 in . We will verify that (µ, γ) is an ex ante exclusion core outcome. To derive a contradiction, assume the contrary.
Thus, there exists a feasible outcome (σ, ψ) and nonempty coalition C ⊆ I such that
Without loss of generality, we may assume that C contains all agents for whom σ
Algorithm 1 constructed (µ, γ) sequentially by removing sets of agents (Ĩ 1 ,Ĩ 2 , . . .) and goods (X 1 ∪X 1 ,X 2 ∪X 2 , . . .). Each i ∈Ĩ t was assigned (his consumption allocation) in step t and each
x ∈X t ∪X t was removed from the market in step t . The latter can occur for two reasons: (a) each x ∈X t was assigned to an agent or to a firm in step t and its capacity was depleted;
or, (b) the production of each x ∈X t became impossible given the assignments in step t .
Colloquially, the firm (potentially) producing x was "shut down."
For every i ∈ C assigned in step t (i.e., i ∈Ĩ t ), σ(i ) must have been removed from the market in step t ′ < t (i.e., σ(i ) ∈X t ′ ∪X t ′ ). If this were not true, then agent i would not have been pointing to his most preferred good among those available at the beginning of step t . Claim 1. There exists an agent j such that µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ). Moreover, this agent was assigned his consumption allocation before any member of coalition C .
Proof of Claim 1. Consider the good x ∈ σ(C ) removed from the market earliest by Algorithm 1.
(If there are multiple such goods, pick any of them.) Suppose this occurs in step t . Since x was removed from the market, x / ∈ µ(C ). (Otherwise, there would be some x ′ ∈ σ(C ) removed from the market strictly earlier than x .) Thus, C ∩Ĩ t ′ = ∅ for all t ′ ≤ t .
Since the assignment of x is different at (µ, γ) than at (σ, ψ), three cases are possible.
Case 1. There exists j ∈ I such that µ( j ) = x . Thus, j is assigned x in step t of Algorithm 1.
Since preferences are strict, j / ∈ C and σ( j ) = µ( j ) imply that µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ).
Case 2. There exists f ∈ F such that x ∈ γ(f ). Thus, there is some produced good x ′ such that (i) x ′ is assigned to some agent j in step t , and (ii) x ∈ Λ γ t (x ′ ). Since x must have capacity one, if x ∈ σ(C ) then it is unavailable as an input at (σ, ψ). Because each production function is Leontief, if x is unavailable as an input for f , then f cannot produce. (The input assignment at γ was efficient.) Therefore, good x ′ also cannot be produced at (σ, ψ). Thus, agent j 's consumption must be different at (σ, ψ), i.e.,
Case 3. The firm producing good x is "shut down" at step t of Algorithm 1. This occurs only if an (indirect) input x ′ for the production of x becomes unavailable at step t . An indirect input becomes unavailable only if it is assigned as a consumption good to some agent j (i.e., µ( j ) = x ′ ) in step t . (This is because x is available at the beginning of step t and the production network γ t is feasible.) But, if x is consumed at (σ, ψ), then x ′ cannot be consumed by j at σ. Hence, σ( j ) = µ( j ). Since no member of C is assigned in step t or earlier, j / ∈ C and we conclude that µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ).
In each case, there is an agent j assigned in step t of Algorithm 1 for whom µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ). ⋄ Given Claim 1, let j be the agent who was assigned earliest by Algorithm 1 and for whom µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ). (If there are multiple such agents, choose any of them.) Let t * be the step in which j 's assignment was set. By Claim 1, each i ∈ C was assigned strictly after step t * .
Next, we show that µ( j ) / ∈ Ω γ (C |ω, µ), which will contradict (14) and thus prove the the-
Suppose µ( j ) ∈ Z 0 = ω(C ). By Lemma 8, there exists i ∈ C µ( j ) ⊆ C who was assigned at step t * or earlier. However, from above we know that no member of C was assigned in step t * , or earlier, of Algorithm 1-a contradiction.
Proceeding by induction, let k ≥ 1 and assume that for k ′ = k − 1, (a) no agent in C ∪ µ −1 (Z k ′ −1 ) was assigned at any step t ≤ t * by Algorithm 1, and (b) µ( j ) / ∈ k ′ ℓ=0 Z ℓ . We will verify that (a) and (b) are true for k ′ = k .
Verification of (a). Suppose i ∈ C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −1 ) was assigned at step t ≤ t * by Algorithm 1. Since Z 0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Z k −1 and no member of C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −2 ) was assigned at any step
. There are two cases. Case 1. µ(i ) ∈ ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −2 )). By Lemma 8, there exists i ′ ∈ C µ(i ) ⊆ C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −2 ) who was assigned at step t ≤ t * of Algorithm 1-a contradiction with point (a) above. Case 2. µ(i ) ∈ α γ (Z k −2 ). Since Z k −2 is a critical input set for µ(i ), there exists x ∈ Z k −2 such that x ∈ Λ γ (µ(i )). By Lemma 8, there exists i ′ ∈ C x who was assigned his consumption allocation in step t ≤ t * of Algorithm 1. Since i ′ is assigned before step t * , by the induction hypothesis i ′ / ∈ C ∪µ −1 (Z k −2 ). Therefore, x / ∈ ω(C ∪µ −1 (Z k −2 )). By Lemma 4, there exists y ∈ ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −3 )) such that y ∈ Λ γ (x ). By Lemma 3(c) , y ∈ Λ γ (µ(i )). By Lemma 8 , there exists an i ′′ ∈ C y ⊆ C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −3 ) who was assigned his consumption allocation in step t ≤ t * of Algorithm 1. However, this is a contradiction as no member
can be assigned in step t * or earlier.
Each case leads to a contradiction. Therefore, no agent in C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −1 ) is assigned at step t * , or earlier, by Algorithm 1.
Applying the same arguments (with all indices shifted up by one) from the verification of (a) above, together with the induction conclusion of (a), we reach a contradiction and establish that µ( j ) / ∈ k ℓ=0 Z ℓ . As the number of goods is finite, 
The condensation of is the economyˆ = 〈Î ,F ,X ,≻,ω〉 where:
• The set of agents isÎ := I .
• The set of firms isF := {f 1 , . . .,f K } where, relabeling if necessary,F consists of allf k such that Wf k = ∅. Each firm's production function isf
. .,f L } be the set of all remainingf k for whom Wf k = ∅.
• The set of goods isX :
The set of primary goods isX 0 :=
• The preference of each i ∈Î equals ≻ i restricted toX , i.e.,≻ i = ≻ i |X .
• The endowment of each coalition C ⊆Î is defined as
and eachĈ x is defined as follows. If x ∈ X 0 , thenĈ x := C x . Otherwise, x ∈ Xf k for somê f k ∈F ∪F andĈ
where
Lemma 11. Let = 〈I , X , F, ≻, ω〉 be an economy satisfying (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3). There exists an ex ante exclusion core outcome in the condensation of .
Proof of Lemma 11. It suffices to show that the condensationˆ = 〈Î ,F ,X ,≻,ω〉 satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 10. First,ˆ is acyclic. This is because the input network ofˆ is a subgraph of the condensation of the input network of . The condensation of a directed graph is acyclic (Bondy and Murty, 2008, pp. 91-92) . Second, by definition, eachf k ∈F has a Leontief production function that is monotone and satisfies the no free lunch property. We demonstrate the remaining three requirements as separate claims.
Claim 1. The endowment systemω satisfies (A1)-(A4).
Proof of Claim 1. It suffices to show thatĈ x = ∅ for each x ∈X . When this is true, properties (A1)-(A4) follow from the definition ofω. If x ∈ X 0 , thenĈ
where the second equality follows from the fact that x ∈ Λ γ (x ). ⋄ Claim 2. There exists a feasible production network γ ′ :F → 2X such thatX =X 0 ∪fF (γ ′ ).
Proof of Claim 2. Define γ
for somef k ∈F . In particular, x ∈ W f for some f ∈ F k . There are two possibilities. If x is a primary good, then x ∈ X 0 ⊆X 0 . Otherwise, x ∈ X f ′ for some f ′ ∈ F ℓ = F k . We know that
Clearly, x ∈ Xf ℓ if and only if (strictly) fewer than q x other firms in F ℓ employ x as an input. If q x = ∞, this is trivially true. If q x = 1 and f ′′ ∈ F ℓ uses x as an input, then f and f ′′ cannot both produce in at γ, contradicting (B2).
Finally, suppose q x < |{f ∈F |x ∈ γ ′ (f )}| for some x ∈X . Since q x = 1, there exist two or more firms that are assigned x as an input at γ ′ . This implies there exist f , f ′ ∈ F such that
Thus, both f and f ′ cannot produce at γ, contradicting (B2). (b) If x / ∈ Wf k , thenf k ∈F and the producer of x , say f ′ , must belong to the same strongly connected component F k . In this case, the definition of γ(·) implies that γ(f ′ ) = W f ′ . Thus, good x is produced by f ′ at (µ, γ) in , i.e., x ∈ f F (γ).
Cases 1 and 2 imply that
Next, consider good x with capacity q x = 1. The following three points together imply that
for all x ∈ X and prove the claim.
(i) At most one agent can be assigned x at (µ, γ) in . This is because µ(i ) =μ(i ) for each i and (μ,γ) is feasible inˆ .
(ii) At most one firm can be assigned x at (µ, γ) in . To see this, suppose f = f ′ are both assigned x as an input. Because q x = 1, firms f and f ′ cannot both produce at γ, a contradiction since all goods are produced at γ.
(iii) It is impossible for an agent and a firm to be simultaneously assigned x at (µ, γ) in .
Suppose this was not true and µ(i ) = x and x ∈ γ(f ) = W f . By definition,μ(i ) = x inˆ .
Since firm f ∈ F k ⊆ F is assigned an input at (µ, γ), the set of goods Xf k must be available
then we have a contradiction as x would be simultaneously assigned to i andf k in the (feasible) outcome (μ,γ) inˆ . Thus, x ∈ f ∈F k X f and, because x is assigned to agent i at (μ,γ),
But then |{f ∈ F k |x ∈ W f }| < q x = 1, which is a contradiction since the set F k contains at least one firm that uses x as an input. ⋄ Next we show that (µ, γ) cannot be ex ante exclusion blocked in . Suppose the contrary.
Thus, there exists a coalition C ⊆ I and a feasible outcome (σ, ψ) in such that σ(i ) ≻ i µ(i ) for all i ∈ C and µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ) =⇒ µ( j ) ∈ Ω γ (C |ω, µ). Without loss of generality, we may assume that C contains all agents i for whom σ(i ) ≻ i µ(i ) is true and that ψ is efficient.
Consider the outcome (σ,ψ) inˆ defined as follows. For each i ∈Î ,σ(i ) = σ(i ). For eacĥ Iff k ∈F , then x ∈ Xf k ⊆X 0 . This is because x was assigned to an agent. Hence, it must either have infinite capacity or it must not be assigned as an input to any other ψ) is feasible, the firm producing
x , say f ′ , must produce at (σ, ψ). There are two subcases.
Suppose f ′ ∈ F ′ k andf ′ k ∈F . Since x was assigned to firm f at ψ, x either has infinite capacity or it was not assigned as an input to any other firm in F ′ k . But then, we know that x ∈ Xf ′ k ⊆X 0 .
Otherwise, suppose f ′ ∈ F ′ k andf ′ k ∈F . All firms in the strongly connected component F ′ k must also produce at (σ, ψ). If F ′ k = F k , then x ∈ψ(f k ), which is not possible. Therefore, at (σ,ψ) . If x / ∈ Xf ′ k , then its capacity is one and there exists some firm f ′′ ∈ F ′ k such that x ∈ W f ′′ . However, above we saw that x ∈ W f and f / ∈ F ′ k . Thus there exist two firms, f and f ′′ , that require the same input good for production. However, this contradicts condition (B2) that was satisfied by .
Cases 1 and 2 imply that if x / ∈ X 0 ∪{x 0 }, then x ∈fF (ψ). Hence,σ(Î )∪ψ(F ) ⊆X 0 ∪fF (ψ)∪{x 0 }.
Next, consider good x with capacity q x = 1. The following three points together imply that |{i ∈Î |σ(i ) = x }| + |{f ∈F |x ∈ψ(f )}| ≤ q x for all x ∈X 0 ∪ {x 0 } ∪fF (ψ) and prove the claim.
(i) At most one agent can be assigned x at (σ,ψ). This is because (σ, ψ) is feasible and σ =σ.
(ii) At most one firm can be assigned x at (σ,ψ). To see this, supposef k andf ℓ are both assigned x at (σ,ψ). This implies there exist two distinct firms f k ∈ F k and f ℓ ∈ F ℓ such that x ∈ ψ(f k ) and x ∈ ψ(f ℓ ). But this means that both firms would not be able to produce at γ, contradicting (B2).
(iii) It is impossible for an agent and a firm to be simultaneously assigned x at (σ,ψ) inˆ .
Suppose the contrary. Ifσ(i ) = x and x ∈ψ(f k ), then there exists a firm f ∈ F k ⊆ F such that x ∈ ψ(f ). Thus, agent i and firm f are both assigned x at (σ, ψ), a contradiction. ⋄ Claim 3.σ(i ) ≻ iμ (i ) for all i ∈ C .
Proof of Claim 3. Sinceσ = σ andμ = µ, it follows thatσ(i ) ≻ iμ (i ) for all i ∈ C . ⋄ Claim 4.μ( j ) ≻ jσ ( j ) =⇒μ( j ) ∈ Ωγ(C |ω,μ)
Proof of Claim 4. Recall that Ω γ (C |ω, µ) = ∞ k =0 Z k where Z 0 = ω(C ) and Z k = Z k −1 ∪ ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −1 )) ∪ α γ (Z k −1 ) for all k ≥ 1. Likewise, Ωγ(C |ω,μ) = ∞ k =0Ẑ k whereẐ 0 =ω(C ) andẐ k = Z k −1 ∪ω(C ∪μ −1 (Ẑ k −1 )) ∪ αγ(Ẑ k −1 ) for all k ≥ 1. Since µ( j ) ≻ j σ( j ) =⇒ µ( j ) ∈ Ω γ (C |ω, µ), σ(i ) =σ(i ) ∈X ∪ {x 0 } for all i , and µ( j ) =μ( j ) ∈X ∪ {x 0 } for all j , to prove the claim it suffices to show that Ω γ (C |ω, µ)∩X ⊆ Ωγ(C |ω,μ). Thus, it suffices to show that Z k ∩X ⊆Ẑ k for all k ≥ 0.
Let k = 0. If x ∈ Z 0 ∩X = ω(C ) ∩X , then C x ⊆ C . Thus,Ĉ x ⊆ C x ⊆ C . Which implies,
x ∈ω(C ) =Ẑ 0 . Proceeding by induction, suppose Z k ′ ∩X ⊆Ẑ k ′ for all k ′ ≤ k −1. Let x ∈ Z k ∩X .
If x ∈ Z k −1 ∩X , then the induction hypothesis implies that x ∈Ẑ k −1 ⊆Ẑ k . Instead, suppose
x / ∈ Z k −1 and x ∈ (ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −1 )) ∪ α γ (Z k −1 )) ∩X . There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose x ∈ ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −1 )). Since µ =μ, the range of µ(·) is contained inX ∪ {x 0 }. Thus, µ −1 (Z k −1 ) = µ −1 (Z k −1 ∩X ) =μ −1 (Z k −1 ∩X ) ⊆μ −1 (Ẑ k −1 ). Therefore, ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −1 )) ⊆ ω(C ∪μ −1 (Ẑ k −1 )). And so, C x ⊆ C ∪μ −1 (Ẑ k −1 ), which impliesĈ x ⊆ C ∪ µ −1 (Ẑ k −1 ). Therefore, x ∈ω(C ∪μ −1 (Ẑ k −1 )) and x ∈Ẑ k .
Case 2. Suppose x ∈ α γ (Z k −1 ). Because each firm's production function is Leontief, there exists y 1 ∈ Z k −1 such that x ∈ α γ (y 1 ). There are two subcases.
(a) y 1 ∈X . Thus, y 1 ∈ Z k −1 ∩X ⊆Ẑ k −1 . As y 1 is critical for x at γ, it remains so atγ since each production function is Leontief. Thus, x ∈ αγ(Ẑ k −1 ), which implies x ∈Ẑ k .
(b) y 1 / ∈X . Thus, there exists some firm f 1 ∈ F k ⊆ F such that y 1 ∈ X f 1 and there must exist some other firm f 0 ∈ F k that uses y 1 as an input. Moreover, the capacity of y 1 must be one (else it would be present inX ). Since y 1 is a critical input for x , it follows that the firm producing x must be f 0 , i.e.,
x ∈ X f 0 and y 1 ∈ W f 0
We know that y 1 ∈ Z k −1 = Z k −2 ∪ω(C ∪µ −1 (Z k −2 ))∪α γ (Z k −2 ). If y 1 ∈ Z k −2 , then x ∈ Z k −1 , which is a contradiction. Three possibilities remain.
(i) y 1 ∈ ω(C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −2 )). In this case, C y ⊆ C ∪ µ −1 (Z k −2 ). However, f 0 , f 1 ∈ F k .
Thus, y 1 ∈ Yf k . Noting (15), this implies thatĈ x ⊆ C y . Hence,Ĉ x ⊆ C ∪µ −1 (Z k −2 ) which (by reasoning analogous to Case 1 above) implies thatĈ x ⊆ C ∪μ −1 (Ẑ k −2 ).
Therefore, x ∈ω(C ∪μ −1 (Ẑ k −2 )). Thus, we can conclude that x ∈Ẑ k −1 ⊆Ẑ k .
(ii) y 1 ∈ α γ (y 2 ) where y 2 ∈ Z k −2 ∩X . This implies then x ∈ αγ(y 2 ). This is because y 2 is an input forf k and x ∈ Xf k . However, y 2 ∈ Z k −2 ∩X implies y 2 ∈Ẑ k −2 . Thus, x ∈ αγ(Ẑ k −2 ), which implies x ∈Ẑ k −1 ⊆Ẑ k .
(iii) y 1 ∈ α γ (y 2 ) where y 2 ∈ Z k −2 and y 2 / ∈X . In this case, we can repeat the preceding argument starting at (b) either establishing that x ∈Ẑ k , as in parts (i) Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose economy satisfies (A1)-(A4) and (B1)-(B3) and each good has capacity one. Letˆ be its condensation. Let (μ,γ) be an outcome identified by Algorithm 1 inˆ . Suppose Algorithm 1 constructs (μ,γ) in T steps. If i ∈ I is assigned x 0 in step t , let S t = {i , x 0 }. Otherwise, let S t be the cycle of agents and goods defining the assignment. (This is the cycle after any "trimming.") Note that Algorithm 1 in step t also identifies a set of goodŝ X t that are never produced. Given (μ,γ), define (µ * , γ * ) in as in the proof of Theorem 3.
To define prices p * supporting (µ * , γ * ) as an equilibrium, we adapt David Gale's argument (Shapley and Scarf, 1974, p. 30) . Let L := |X | be the number of goods and assign the price p * x 0 = 0 to the outside option. Let π 1 > · · · > π T > 0 be a set of values such that π t > L 2L π t +1 . We define prices inductively. Let P 0 = ∅ and for each t ≥ 1 let P t be the set of goods whose prices have been defined by the end of step t . At step t ≥ 1 define prices as follows given P t −1 .
Step t . If S t ∩ X = ∅, set P t = P t −1 and proceed to step t + 1. Otherwise, for each x ∈ S t ∩ X set p * x = π t . Let P t 0 ⊇ P t −1 be the set of all goods with defined prices. Continuing inductively, at iteration τ ≥ 1, for each good y without a defined price yet and that satisfies x ∈ X f and y ∈ W f for some x ∈ P t τ−1 , set p * y = π t /L τ . Let P t τ be the set of all goods with defined prices. As there are L goods, there exists a τ * ≤ L such that for all τ ≥ τ * , P t τ * = P t τ . Given these prices, each firm producing a good whose price has been defined maximizes profits by producing since the value of its output(s) exceeds the price it pays for all inputs.
Next consider the set of goodsX t . For each x ∈X t that is produced by some firm using an input in P t L , set p * x = π t /L L +1 . Now, let P t L +1 be the set of goods with defined prices. Continuing inductively, at iteration τ ≥ 1, for each x ∈X t that is produced by some firm using an input y ∈ P t L +τ−1 and whose price has not yet been defined, set p * x = π t /L L +τ . Let P t L +τ be the set of all goods with defined prices. Continue this process until all goods inX t have a set price. This process stops after at most L iterations. Let P t be the set of goods with defined prices and proceed to step t + 1. Given these prices every firm that can produce some x ∈X t maximizes profits by not producing because the price of at least one necessary input exceeds the maximum revenue the firm may earn selling its output.
The above process continues until step T . Set p * x = 0 for any x whose price remains undefined. The feasible outcome (µ * , γ * ) is an equilibrium relative to p * . If x ≻ i µ * (i ), then good x was removed from the market prior to i 's assignment. Therefore, p * x > p * µ * (i ) . Similarly, by construction each firm is maximizing profits. The price of its outputs exceeds its input cost. Each firm's production plan is efficient. Hence, it cannot increase profits by using fewer inputs.
